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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-13870-RGS 
 
JANE DOE NO. 1, a minor child,  
by her parent and next friend MARY ROE;  
JANE DOE NO. 2;  
and JANE DOE NO. 3, a minor child,  
by her parents and next friends SAM LOE AND SARA LOE 
 
v. 
 
BACKPAGE.COM, LLC, CAMARILLO HOLDINGS, LLC  
(f/k/a VILLAGE VOICE MEDIA HOLDINGS, LLC),  
and NEW TIMES MEDIA, LLC 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER  
ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
May 15, 2015 
 
STEARNS, D.J.  
 In this litigation, two important public policies collide head on – the 
suppression of child sex trafficking and the promotion of a free and open 
Internet.  Plaintiffs Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 (the 
Doe plaintiffs) seek redress in the form of money damages from defendants 
Backpage.com, LLC; Camarillo Holdings, LLC (f/k/a Village Voice Media 
Holdings, LLC); and New Times Media, LLC.  The Doe plaintiffs allege that 
they were molested and repeatedly raped after being advertised as sexual 
wares on defendants’ website, backpage.com (Backpage).  Defendants 
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contend that most of the Doe plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230, and that the 
remaining intellectual property claims (unauthorized use of a person’s image 
and copyright infringement) fail to state claims upon which relief may be 
granted. 
BACKGROUND1 
 Backpage is an online classifieds forum that groups goods and services 
advertised for sale by geographic location and subject matter.  At issue in this 
case is the forum’s adult entertainment section and its subcategory offering 
the services of “escorts.”  The Doe plaintiffs allege that in the scungy world 
of adult entertainment, this section of Backpage is a notorious haven for 
promoters of the illicit sex trade, and even more troubling, the trafficking of 
children for sex.  The Doe plaintiffs contend that Backpage’s business model 
depends in large part on the revenues it earns from its involvement in the 
trafficking of children.  To this end, Backpage is alleged to have structured 
its adult entertainment section to lightly camouflage its illegal content to 
divert the attention of law enforcement.  In support, the Second Amended 
Complaint (SAC) marshals the following facts: 
                                            
1 On a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true the well-pleaded 
facts of a complaint.  
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● Backpage charges a fee for posting advertisements in the adult 
entertainment section (and not in most other licit areas of the 
website).  The fee for the “adult” ads ranges from $12.00 to $17.00 
per posting.  Backpage charges an additional fee for each reposting 
of an adult ad, and for featuring the ad (with a selection of text and 
photos) prominently on the right side of the website. 
 
● Backpage does not require posters in the adult entertainment 
section to verify their identity.  The website also does not require 
that the poster use a registered credit card linked with a name and 
address, and accepts anonymous payments in the form of prepaid 
credit cards, or pseudo-currencies, such as Bitcoin. 
 
● Backpage does not require a poster to verify the age of an “escort” 
whose services are offered on the website. Although the website will 
not accept an ad when the poster enters an age of less than 18, it will 
permit the poster to immediately re-enter an assumed age. 
 
● Backpage does not require any verification of the telephone 
numbers posted in its adult entertainment section.  It also permits 
users to enter telephone numbers using any combination of 
character strokes rather than in the more traceable (by law 
enforcement) nominal numbers required in other sections of the 
website (such as “twoO13fourFive678niNe” rather than “201-345-
6789”).  Backpage does not require posters in the adult 
entertainment section to use their actual email addresses, but 
provides an email forwarding service that protects a poster’s 
anonymity. 
 
● Backpage strips out metadata associated with photographs (such as 
date, time, geolocation and other identifying information) before 
publishing the photographs on its website.  This prevents law 
enforcement from effectively searching for repostings of the same 
photograph. 
 
● While Backpage bars the use of certain words and phrases through 
its “automatic filtering” system, such as “barely legal,” “high 
school,” “innocent,” “sex,” “blow job,” “hand job,” “schoolgirl,” 
“teen”, and “teenage,” it readily permits the use of suggestive 
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circumlocutions like “girl,” “young,” “underage,” and “fresh.”  It also 
does not filter out easily recognizable abbreviations of forbidden 
words, such as “brly legal” or “high schl.” 
 
 The Doe plaintiffs further allege that defendants have waged a phony 
war against sex traffickers to divert attention from their illegal activities.  
While Backpage claims that its adult entertainment advertisements are 
screened by trained moderators, it has refused to install readily available 
technology that would far more accurately detect the trafficking of children.  
According to the Second Amended Complaint, Backpage’s highly touted 
claim to make regular referrals to the National Center of Missing & Exploited 
Children has led to few instances of identification or rescue.  Although 
Backpage will on request remove an offending ad in the geographic location 
in which it is posted, it does nothing to report or remove the identical ad 
posted in other geographical areas, or other ads involving the same child.  
The overall effect, the Doe plaintiffs contend, is to create a Potemkin-like 
“façade of concern” that obscures the shady source of its filthy lucre.  SAC ¶ 
34.   
 Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3 aver that they have 
been each personally harmed by defendants’ unsavory business practices.  
Jane Doe No. 1 was first trafficked by pimps on Backpage after running away 
from home in February of 2012, when she was 15 years old.  She was again 
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sold on Backpage in March of 2013, after she ran away a second time.  
Between June of 2013 and September 10, 2013, her “services” were 
advertised on Backpage each and every day.  As a result of the ads, she 
engaged in 10 to 12 sex transactions daily with adult men in Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island.  Her pimp moved her from town to town every two days 
to avoid detection.  Jane Doe No. 1 appeared on some 300 ads on Backpage 
and was raped over 1,000 times.   
Backpage listed each ad featuring Jane Doe No. 1 as an offer of “escort” 
services, a common euphemism for prostitution.  The Jane Doe No. 1 ads 
included known signifiers for child prostitution such as “young,” “girl,” 
“fresh,” “tiny,” “roses,” and “party.”  Jane Doe No. 1’s pimp provided a 
prepaid mobile phone and a prepaid credit card to conceal Jane Doe No. 1’s 
identity when Jane Doe No. 1 placed ads on Backpage.  When Jane Doe No. 
1 attempted to enter her true age (which was under 18) during the purchase 
of an ad, Backpage would instruct her to enter her age as 18 or older.  
Photographs of Jane Doe No. 1 (with her facial features obscured, but at least 
on one occasion displaying a unique tattoo) accompanied all of her ads. 
Jane Doe No. 2 was trafficked on Backpage by her pimp during various 
periods between 2010 and 2012 at different locations in Massachusetts.  She 
first appeared on Backpage when she was 15 years old, after she had 
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absconded from a residential program.  Ads featuring Jane Doe No. 2 were 
posted either by her pimp or an older woman who worked with him (his 
“bottom”).  The ads would appear on Backpage on average six times a day.  
Jane Doe No. 2 was given a prepaid mobile phone to answer calls from 
would-be customers generated by the Backpage ads.  As a result of the ads, 
she was coerced into 5-15 sex transactions every day.  Like the ads of Jane 
Doe No. 1, those of Jane Doe No. 2 featured her photograph.  The ads were 
placed using a prepaid credit card.  Altogether, Jane Doe No. 2 was raped 
over 900 times while in the thrall of her pimp.   
 Jane Doe No. 3 was trafficked on Backpage in December of 2013 by her 
pimp and one or more of his associates.  The Backpage solicitations for the 
underage Jane Doe No. 3 described her as “new,” “sweet,” and “playful.” As 
with the other Jane Does, the ads were paid for with a prepaid credit card.  
Jane Doe No. 3 was also given a mobile phone to take calls and texts from 
customers.  She was taken to a hotel in Foxborough, Massachusetts, where 
she was raped by men who responded to the ads.  Photos of Jane Doe No. 3, 
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including one that she had taken of herself, appeared with the ads on 
Backpage.2 
 The Doe plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in October of 2014.  In their 
Second Amended Complaint, they allege that defendants’ business practices 
violate the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (Count I); the Massachusetts Anti-Human 
Trafficking and Victim Protection Act of 2010 (MATA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
265, § 50 (Count II); and constitute unfair and deceptive business practices 
under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
93A, § 9 (Count III).  The Doe plaintiffs also bring claims for unauthorized 
use of pictures of a person, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 214, § 3A and R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 9-1-28 (Count IV), and copyright infringement (specific to the photograph 
taken by Jane Doe No. 3 of herself) (Count V).  In January of 2015, 
defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The parties and several amici curiae3 filed helpful 
briefs.  The court heard oral argument on April 15, 2015.  
                                            
2 At some point, Jane Doe No. 3’s parents became aware of the ads 
featuring their daughter on Backpage and demanded that they be taken 
down.  A week later, the illicit ads still appeared on the website. 
 
3 The City and County of San Francisco, the City of Atlanta, the City and 
County of Denver, the City of Houston, the City of Philadelphia, and the City 
of Portland (Oregon) (collectively the local government amici) and the 
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DISCUSSION 
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of 
a complaint must “possess enough heft” to set forth “a plausible entitlement 
to relief.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 559 (2007); see also 
Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st Cir. 2008).  As the Supreme 
Court has emphasized, this standard “demands more than an unadorned, 
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.  A pleading that offers 
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action will not do.  Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked 
assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 Defendants rely primarily on the immunity provided by Congress in 
enacting 47 U.S.C. § 230, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider,” id. § 
230(c)(1), and the concomitant preemption of “cause[s] of action . . . brought 
                                            
Commonwealth of Massachusetts submitted two amicus briefs in support of 
plaintiffs.  The Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy & 
Technology, and Professor Eric Goldman (of Santa Clara University School 
of Law) (collectively EFF) submitted an amicus brief in support of 
defendants. 
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. . . under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” Id. § 
230(e)(3).4  There is no dispute that defendants are, as the operators of 
Backpage, providers of an interactive computer service.  Defendants contend 
that because the Doe plaintiffs allege they were harmed by the contents of 
postings that defendants had no part in creating, the claims fall squarely 
within Congress’s exemption of interactive computer service providers from 
liability for third-party Internet content. 
Congress enacted section 230 in 1996, while the Internet was still in its 
infancy.  Congress explained the purposes of the law in five pertinent 
findings: 
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive 
computer services available to individual Americans represent 
an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and 
informational resources to our citizens. 
 
                                            
4 The Doe plaintiffs argue that the court should first assess the 
plausibility and sufficiency of the factual allegations relevant to each claim 
before reaching the immunity issue.  However, the entitlement to immunity 
under section 230 is not only an affirmative defense, but also the right to be 
immune from being sued.  See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 
F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003); accord Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 
1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Section 230 “can [] support a motion to dismiss 
if the statute’s barrier to suit is evident from the face of the complaint.”); 
Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (same).  
As the Supreme Court counsels, a claim of entitlement to immunity should 
be “resolv[ed] . . . at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”  Hunter v. 
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).   
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(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the 
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even 
greater control in the future as technology develops. 
 
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a 
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique 
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for 
intellectual activity. 
 
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have 
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of 
government regulation. 
 
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a 
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment 
services. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 230(a).   Consistent with these findings, section 230 reflects the 
“policy of the United States”  
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and 
other interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer 
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; 
 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which 
maximize user control over what information is received by 
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other 
interactive computer services; 
 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization 
of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to 
restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate 
online material; and 
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(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to 
deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and 
harassment by means of computer. 
 
Id. § 230(b).  
  
 The Doe plaintiffs argue that because the Internet has matured since 
the enactment of section 230, the principal policy consideration that 
animated Congress (promoting the growth of the Internet by insulating it 
from regulatory restrictions and lawsuits) no longer has the assuasive force 
that it may once have had.  They cite the characterization of section 230’s 
immunity guarantee as an affirmative defense in cases like Klayman and 
Ricci as evidence that the courts have been whittling back the scope of section 
230 immunity as the Internet has shed its training wheels.  See Klayman, 
753 F.3d at 1357; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 28.  The argument, however, does not 
bear scrutiny.  Both the Klayman and Ricci courts, whatever the label they 
used to describe section 230’s effect, found the interactive computer service 
providers at issue to be immune from any imputation of liability for third-
party speech.  Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357-1359; Ricci, 781 F.3d at 27-28.  
Moreover, Congress, far from lowering the immunity bar, ratcheted it up in 
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2010 by expanding the scope of section 230 immunity to preempt the 
enforcement of inconsistent foreign judgments.  See 28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1).5  
The local government amici attempt to repackage Backpage as an 
“information content provider,” an entity that section 230 defines as “any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).  Their ultimate point is 
that information content providers are excluded from the immunity granted 
by section 230.  The amici contend that Backpage generates content by: (1) 
posting illegal materials in sponsored ads; (2) stripping metadata from 
posted photos; (3) coaching the crafting of ads by allowing misspellings of 
suggestive terms; and (4) designing the escorts section of the website in such 
a way as to signal to readers that sex with children is sold here.  The amici 
argument relies heavily on Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).  In that case, the Ninth 
                                            
 5 Section 4102(c)(1) reads as follows: “Notwithstanding any other 
provision of Federal or State law, a domestic court shall not recognize or 
enforce a foreign judgment for defamation against the provider of an 
interactive computer service, as defined in section 230 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230) unless the domestic court 
determines that the judgment would be consistent with section 230 if the 
information that is the subject of such judgment had been provided in the 
United States.” 
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Circuit determined Roommates.com, a roommate matching service, to be an 
“information content provider” shorn of section 230 immunity because it 
elicited information about personal characteristics of users that is forbidden 
by the Fair Housing Act.  Id. at 1169-1170.  The Court reasoned that 
Roommate’s connection to the discriminatory filtering process is 
direct and palpable: Roommate designed its search and email 
systems to limit the listings available to subscribers based on sex, 
sexual orientation and presence of children.  Roommate selected 
the criteria used to hide listings, and Councils allege that the act 
of hiding certain listings is itself unlawful under the Fair Housing 
Act, which prohibits brokers from steering clients in accordance 
with discriminatory preferences. 
 
Id. 
 
 To get to its result, the Court in Roommates attempted to draw a line 
between active control of the content of a web posting and the provision of a 
neutral interactive service that simply replicates offending third-party 
matter.6 
If an individual uses an ordinary search engine to query for a 
“white roommate,” the search engine has not contributed to any 
alleged unlawfulness in the individual’s conduct; providing 
neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches 
does not amount to “development” for purposes of the immunity 
exception. . . . Similarly, a housing website that allows users to 
specify whether they will or will not receive emails by means of 
user-defined criteria might help some users exclude email from 
                                            
 6 Roommates is one of the few sentinels denying section 230 immunity 
left standing among some 300 cases (as of 2012) that have decided the issue.  
See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227, 239 (2012).   
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other users of a particular race or sex.  However, that website 
would be immune, so long as it does not require the use of 
discriminatory criteria.  A website operator who edits user-
created content – such as by correcting spelling, removing 
obscenity or trimming for length – retains his immunity for any 
illegality in the user-created content, provided that the edits are 
unrelated to the illegality. 
 
Id. at 1169 (bold emphasis added).  This latter passage lays out the distinction 
that afforded immunity to craigslist.com, an online classifieds forum that 
also published discriminatory housing ads.  “Nothing in the service craigslist 
offers induces anyone to post any particular listing or express a preference 
for discrimination; for example, craigslist does not offer a lower price to 
people who include discriminatory statements in their postings.”  Chicago 
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 
F.3d 666, 671-672 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 Singly or in the aggregate, the allegedly sordid practices of Backpage 
identified by amici amount to neither affirmative participation in an illegal 
venture nor active web content creation.  Nothing in the escorts section of 
Backpage requires users to offer or search for commercial sex with children.  
The existence of an escorts section in a classified ad service, whatever its 
social merits, is not illegal.  The creation of sponsored ads with excerpts 
taken from the original posts reflects the illegality (or legality) of the original 
posts and nothing more.  Similarly, the automatic generation of navigational 
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path names that identify the ads as falling within the “escorts” category is not 
content creation.  See Seldon v. Magedson, 2014 WL 1456316, at *5-6 (D. 
Ariz. April 15, 2014).  The stripping of metadata from photographs is a 
standard practice among Internet service providers.  Hosting anonymous 
users and accepting payments from anonymous sources in Bitcoins, 
peppercorns, or whatever, might have been made illegal by Congress, but it 
was not.  Backpage’s passivity and imperfect filtering system may be 
appropriate targets for criticism, but they do not transform Backpage into an 
information content provider. 
 Although the Doe plaintiffs recognize that defendants did not author 
the content of the offending ads, see Opp’n at 16 (“Plaintiffs’ trafficking 
claims do not seek to ‘impute’ to [d]efendants any advertisements created by 
others”), they challenge the breadth of the immunity sought by defendants.   
Count I alleges a violation of a section of the TVPRA, a federal statute that 
criminalizes sex trafficking.  As the Doe plaintiffs note, section 230 expressly 
states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the 
enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to 
obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or 
any other Federal criminal statute.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (emphasis 
added).  Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ business practices, “even if the 
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advertisements had never been posted,” Opp’n at 16, are sufficient to make 
out a violation of the TVPRA.  Furthermore, according to the Doe plaintiffs, 
section 230 only immunizes “action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  The Doe plaintiffs argue that their 
claims are of a different sort – they allege that defendants have intentionally 
and in bad faith hidden behind ineffectual counter-trafficking measures to 
deflect the scrutiny of law enforcement and social services agencies.  Count 
II alleges a violation of the MATA, the Massachusetts analog to the TVPRA.  
The Doe plaintiffs argue that, because claims under the TVPRA are exempt 
from the scope of section 230’s immunity, the claim under MATA does not 
depend on “inconsistent state law” preempted by section 230.  Count III, 
which presses a claim of unfair and deceptive businesses practices under 
Massachusetts law, is alleged to arise not from the posted ads and their 
contents, but from the architecture of Backpage itself, which the Doe 
plaintiffs contend is constructed to conceal illegal activity from law 
enforcement.  Finally, the Doe plaintiffs rely on Congress’s stricture that 
section 230 “shall not be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to 
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intellectual property,” id. § 230(e)(2), as preserving the intellectual property 
claims (unauthorized publicity and copyright infringement).7  I will examine 
the viability of each count in turn. 
Civil Remedy under the TVPRA 
 18 U.S.C. § 1595 provides victims of trafficking the right to bring a 
private civil action for restitution against “whoever knowingly benefits, 
financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture 
which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in 
violation of this chapter.”  The parties dispute whether a civil action 
authorized by a criminal statute can be construed as “enforcement of . . . a 
Federal criminal statute” exempt from the immunity provided by section 
230(e)(1).8 
                                            
7 Defendants do not rely on section 230 immunity with respect to the 
copyright infringement claim, but contend, to be discussed infra, that it 
should be dismissed on other grounds.  
 
8 The Doe plaintiffs, citing Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 
2009), also contend that their TVPRA claim falls outside of the protections 
of section 230 immunity because section 1595 imposes a duty of care on 
defendants wholly independent of their role as publishers of speech.  In 
Barnes, the Ninth Circuit barred a negligent undertaking claim under 
Oregon law that sought to hold Yahoo liable for an alleged failure to remove 
indecent profiles of a plaintiff that had been posted by her ex-boyfriend 
because the claim attempted to impose publisher liability on Yahoo for 
content created by a third party.  Id. at 1102-1105 (“The word ‘undertaking,’ 
after all, is meaningless without the following verb.  That is, one does not 
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 The Doe plaintiffs maintain that the statutory language, 
“enforce[ing] . . . a Federal criminal statute,” implies more than a 
dependence on criminal prosecution alone.  See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th 
ed. 2014) (to “enforce” is “[t]o give force or effect to” or “[l]oosely, to compel 
a person to pay damages for not complying with . . . .”).  Further, plaintiffs 
contend that civil actions are frequently authorized as part and parcel of the 
enforcement regime behind criminal statutes.  See Luka v. Procter & Gamble 
Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 712, 719 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[C]ivil enforcement 
mechanisms [] permit private parties to sue to enforce statutory 
                                            
merely undertake; one undertakes to do something.  And what is the 
undertaking that Barnes alleges Yahoo failed to perform with due care?  The 
removal of the indecent profiles that her former boyfriend posted on Yahoo’s 
website.  But removing content is something publishers do, and to impose 
liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable 
party as a publisher of the content it failed to remove.”). 
 
The Court did, however, allow a claim of promissory estoppel to stand 
on the allegation that a Director of Communications at Yahoo had contacted 
plaintiff and promised to remove the offending ads, but failed to do so in a 
timely manner.  Id. at 1107-1109.  “Contract liability here would come not 
from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be 
legally obligated to do something, which happens to be removal of material 
from publication.”  Id. at 1107.  There is no claim by the Doe plaintiffs that 
any such assurance was given to them by Backpage.  As Barnes illustrates, 
the existence of a statutory remedy without more does not give rise mirabile 
dictu to a tort duty.  If it did, there would no need to create such a remedy in 
the first place. 
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prohibitions.” (emphasis added)).  Plaintiffs also rely on dicta in Nieman v. 
Versuslaw, Inc., 2012 WL 3201931, at *9 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012), surmising 
that section 230 “arguably . . . may not be used to bar a civil RICO claim 
because that would impair the enforcement of a Federal criminal statute.” 
Defendants, for their part, point out that courts have consistently 
rejected this argument in a section 230 immunity context.  In Doe v. Bates, 
2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006), the court held that Yahoo could 
not be held civilly liable for allegedly knowingly hosting child pornography 
on a user site styled as the Candyman e-group.  The Magistrate Judge 
examined “th[is] issue of first impression” in scholarly detail that is worth 
quoting at length.  Id., at *3. 
The plain text of the statute establishes that the 230(e)(1) 
exception does not encompass private civil claims.  As argued by 
Defendant, the common definition of the term “criminal,” as well 
as its use in the context of Section 230(e)(1), specifically excludes 
and is distinguished from civil claims.  The term “criminal” is 
defined as “[c]onnected with the administration of penal justice.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 302; see also American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 430 (4th ed. 2000) (defining 
“criminal” as “[r]elating to the administration of penal law”).  
The term “civil” is defined as follows: “[o]f or relating to private 
rights and remedies that are sought by action or suit, as distinct 
from criminal proceedings.” Black’s Law Dictionary 262 
(emphasis added).  In addition, Congress’ use of the word 
“enforcement” in Section 230(e)(1) again confirms that the 
exception refers to governmental action, not civil actions by a 
private litigant. 
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Congress did not bifurcate any statutes as asserted by Plaintiffs. 
Rather, as noted by Defendant, it preserved the ability of law 
enforcement officials to enforce the federal criminal laws to their 
fullest extent while at the same time eliminating the ability of 
private plaintiffs to pursue service-provider defendants. Given 
the complexity of Title 18 and the availability of civil remedies in 
statutes throughout the criminal code, Congress achieved its 
intended result using simple language making it clear that 
Section 230’s limits on civil liability would not affect 
governmental enforcement of federal criminal laws. 
 
As noted by Defendant, Plaintiffs’ invocation of Section 230(e)(1) 
rests on their generalized policy arguments rather than the text 
of the statute.  Plaintiffs’ core argument appears to be that 
Section 230(e)(1) must exempt civil claims under the child 
pornography statutes because child pornography is “not to be 
tolerated” and “[i]f the prospect of civil liability provides a 
disincentive for engaging in child pornography over and above 
that provided by the prospect of fines and jail time, then that is a 
good thing.” 
 
Child pornography obviously is intolerable, but civil immunity 
for interactive service providers does not constitute “tolerance” 
of child pornography any more than civil immunity from the 
numerous other forms of harmful content that third parties may 
create constitutes approval of that content.  Section 230 does not 
limit anyone’s ability to bring criminal or civil actions against the 
actual wrongdoers, the individuals who actually create and 
consume the child pornography.  Here, both the neighbor [who 
created the child pornography] and the moderator of the 
Candyman web site have been prosecuted and are serving 
sentences in federal prison. Further, the section 230(e)(1) 
exemption permits law enforcement authorities to bring criminal 
charges against even interactive service providers in the event 
that they themselves actually violate federal criminal laws. 
 
Regarding civil liability, however, Congress decided not to allow 
private litigants to bring civil claims based on their own beliefs 
that a service provider’s actions violated the criminal laws.  As 
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Defendant explained in its briefing, the reason is evident.  If civil 
liability were possible, the incentive to bring a civil claim for the 
settlement value could be immense, even if a plaintiff’s claim was 
without merit.  Even if it ultimately prevailed, the service 
provider would face intense public scrutiny and substantial 
expense.  Given the millions of communications that a service 
provider such as Defendant enables, the service provider could 
find itself a defendant in numerous such cases. Congress 
determined that it wanted to eliminate the resulting 
disincentives to the development of vibrant and diverse services 
involving third-party communication, while maintaining the 
ability of criminal prosecutions by the government for violations 
of federal criminal law.  In sum, Congress did intend to treat civil 
and criminal claims differently and carefully crafted Section 
230(e)(1) to achieve exactly that result. Plaintiffs’ claim, although 
novel, is untenable and without merit.  
 
Id., at *21-22. 
 The District Judge adopted the Magistrate Judge’s opinion, also noting 
that 
[t]he legislative history [] buttresses the Congressional policy 
against civil liability for internet service providers.  One key 
proponent of an amendment containing the language of § 230 at 
issue explained that “the existing legal system provides a massive 
disincentive for the people who might best help us control the 
Internet to do so.”  141 Cong. Rec. H8469.  Several legislators 
identified “obscenity” in particular as material that could be 
more freely regulated as a result of the immunity provided by the 
statute.  Another proponent noted that “[t]here is no way that 
any of [the internet service providers], like Prodigy, can take the 
responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming 
in to them from all manner of sources onto their bulletin 
board. . . . We are talking about . . . thousands of pages of 
information every day, and to have that imposition imposed on 
them is wrong.” Id. at H8471.  The House approved the 
amendment by a vote of 410 to 4.  Id. at H8478. 
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Id., at *4.  The court concluded that on the basis of this legislative history, 
“Congress decided not to allow private litigants to bring civil claims based 
on their own beliefs that a service provider’s actions violated the criminal 
laws.”  Id., at *5. 
 In M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 
2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011), the court adopted the reasoning of Bates and 
rejected the identical argument from plaintiff, a victim of child sex 
trafficking, that section 230 carved out an exemption for the civil claim that 
she had brought against Backpage under 18 U.S.C. § 1595.  Id. at 1055-1056.  
Similarly, in Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261 (D.N.J. July 31, 2014), 
the court rejected plaintiff’s effort to claim private redress for defendants’ 
alleged criminal conspiracy to violate his rights.  Id., at *8.  “Even if Plaintiff 
had alleged any facts to sustain this claim, the CDA exception for federal 
criminal statutes applies to government prosecutions, not to civil private 
rights of action under stat[utes] with criminal aspects.”  Id.    
Although the Doe plaintiffs challenge this line of cases as “flawed,” the 
court is persuaded that criminal and civil actions differ in kind and that 
section 230 exempts only criminal prosecutions.  Section 1595 itself 
recognizes that although a private right of action may be complementary to 
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government interests in combating trafficking, a civil action primarily 
vindicates private interests and must take a back seat to a criminal 
prosecution.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1) (“Any civil action filed under this 
section shall be stayed during the pendency of any criminal action arising out 
of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.”).  The court also 
finds persuasive amici EFF’s argument that only criminal prosecutions are 
exempted from section 230’s immunity because they are subject to the filter 
of prosecutorial discretion and a heightened standard of proof, making them 
less likely to have a chilling effect on the freedom of online speech.9 
The Doe plaintiffs’ next argument, that section 230 only immunizes 
“good faith” efforts to restrict access to offensive materials, has also failed to 
find support in the decided cases.  Section 203(c)(1) states that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”   Section 230(c)(2) further provides that 
                                            
9  Defendants also contend that plaintiffs fail to make out a case under 
18 U.S.C. § 1595 because they do not allege that defendants shared the 
traffickers’ criminal intent.  Plaintiffs counter that section 1595 imposes 
liability not only for aiding and abetting, but more broadly for “participation 
in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in 
an act in violation of this chapter.”  Id. § 1595(a) (emphasis added).  The court 
need not decide this issue because it holds that this claim is preempted by 
section 230 immunity. 
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[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
held liable on account of –  
  
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user 
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not 
such material is constitutionally protected; or 
 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means to 
restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). 
  
Where section 230(c)(1) exempts an interactive service provider from 
liability for publishing third-party content, section 230(c)(2) also immunizes 
these providers from liability for actions taken in good faith to restrict 
offensive content. 
[Section] 230(c)(1) contains no explicit exception for 
impermissible editorial motive, whereas § 230(c)(2) does 
contain a “good faith” requirement for the immunity provided 
therein.  That § 230(c)(2) expressly provides for a good faith 
element omitted from § 230(c)(1) indicates that Congress 
intended not to import a subjective intent/good faith limitation 
into § 230(c)(1).  “[W]here Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . . , it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”  Keene Corp. 
v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 [] (1993).  Accordingly, the 
text of the two subsections of § 230(c) indicates that (c)(1)’s 
immunity applies regardless of whether the publisher acts in 
good faith. 
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Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 2011 WL 5079526, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011), aff’d, 
765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014).10   
 Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices  
 The Doe plaintiffs contend that the claim for unfair and deceptive 
business practices under the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act,  Gen. 
Laws ch. 93, § 9, survives section 230 immunity because it does not depend 
on the content of the advertisements themselves, but rather on the 
“deceptive” design of Backpage.  Without the offending ads, however, no 
nexus would exist between Backpage and the harms suffered by the Doe 
plaintiffs.  Their theory – that absent the permissive website design and 
imperfect filtering, their pimps would not have trafficked them or, if they had 
attempted to do so, law enforcement would have scrutinized Backpage more 
closely and would possibly have intervened to prevent their injuries – is too 
speculative to fall as a matter of law within the penumbra of reasonably 
foreseeability. 
Moreover, courts have repeatedly rejected this “entire website” theory 
as inconsistent with the substance and policy of section 230.  In Universal 
                                            
10 Because the CDA immunizes Backpage from private litigants seeking 
redress under civil law, the parallel state law claim under the MATA is 
necessarily inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the CDA. 
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Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007), the First 
Circuit refused to hold Lycos (a search engine) liable for the “construct and 
operation” of its website.  Id. at 422.  “Lycos’s decision not to reduce 
misinformation by changing its web site policies was as much an editorial 
decision with respect to that misinformation as a decision not to delete a 
particular posting.  Section 230 immunity does not depend on the form that 
decision takes.”  Id.; see also StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. at 245 (rejecting 
the “entire website” approach in determining whether the Internet ticket 
marketplace may be held responsible for scalpers’ unfair or deceptive trade 
practices); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 
250, 257 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding a “structure and design” approach 
inapplicable where, unlike in Roommates, the design of website did not 
“require[] users to input illegal content as a necessary condition of use.”).11 
 Also problematic is the suggestion that either knowledge or tacit 
encouragement of illegal content (but not the content itself) can be the basis 
                                            
11 Court have also rejected consumer protection claims under section 
230(c)(1) that seek to hold interactive service providers liable for third-party 
content.  See, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 421-422 (Florida securities and 
cyberstalking laws); Hinton v. Amazon.com, 2014 WL 6982628, at *1 (S.D. 
Miss. Dec. 9, 2014) (Mississippi Consumer Protection Act); Obado, 2014 WL 
3778261, at *1 (New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act); Goddard v. Google, 2008 
WL 5245490, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (California Unfair Competition 
Law). 
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for interactive web services liability.  “It is, by now, well established that 
notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided is not enough to 
make it the service provider’s own speech.”  Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420; see also 
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The simple fact 
of notice surely cannot transform one from an original publisher to a 
distributor in the eyes of the law.”).   Moreover,  
there is simply no authority for the proposition that [encouraging 
the publication of defamatory content] makes the website 
operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the ‘creation or 
development’ of every post on the site. . . . Unless Congress 
amends the [CDA], it is legally (although perhaps not ethically) 
beside the point whether defendants refuse to remove the 
material, or how they might use it to their advantage.  
 
Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted, ellipsis in original).  Indeed,  
an encouragement test would inflate the meaning of 
“development” to the point of eclipsing the immunity from 
publisher-liability that Congress established.  Many websites not 
only allow but also actively invite and encourage users to post 
particular types of content.  Some of this content will be 
unwelcome to others – e.g., unfavorable reviews of consumer 
products and services, allegations of price gouging, complaints of 
fraud on consumers, reports of bed bugs, collections of cease-
and-desist notices relating to online speech.  And much of this 
content is commented upon by the website operators who make 
the forum available.  Indeed, much of it is “adopted” by website 
operators, gathered into reports, and republished online.  Under 
an encouragement test of development, these websites would 
lose the immunity under the CDA and be subject to hecklers’ 
suits aimed at the publisher.  Moreover, under the district court’s 
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rule, courts would then have to decide what constitutes 
“encouragement” in order to determine immunity under the 
CDA – a concept that is certainly more difficult to define and 
apply than the Ninth Circuit’s material contribution test. See 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.  Congress envisioned an uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open internet, see § 230(a)(1)-(5), but the 
muddiness of an encouragement rule would cloud that vision.  
Accordingly, other courts have declined to hold that websites 
were not entitled to the immunity furnished by the CDA because 
they selected and edited content for display, thereby encouraging 
the posting of similar content. 
 
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 414-415 (6th 
Cir. 2014).12 
 Right of Publicity  
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A, provides that  
 
[a]ny person whose name, portrait or picture is used within the 
commonwealth for advertising purposes or for the purposes of 
trade without his written consent may bring a civil action in the 
superior court against the person so using his name, portrait or 
picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and may recover 
damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such use. 
 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28 provides in almost identical language that 
[a]ny person whose name, portrait, or picture is used within the 
state for commercial purposes without his or her written consent 
                                            
12 Defendants also argue that the Chapter 93A claim, in so far as it is 
based on alleged misrepresentations to law enforcement and social services 
agencies, lacks an essential foundational element because law enforcement 
and social services agencies have no connection in a commercial context to 
defendants as “consumers” of goods and services.  
 
Case 1:14-cv-13870-RGS   Document 53   Filed 05/15/15   Page 28 of 34
29 
may bring an action in the superior court against the person so 
using his or her name, portrait, or picture to prevent and restrain 
the use thereof, and may recover damages for any injuries 
sustained by reason of such use. 
 
Accepting, dubitante, the Doe plaintiffs’ assertion that the right to publicity 
constitutes an intellectual property claim exempt from immunity under 
section 230,13 the court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs have not pled 
                                            
13 Although certain publicity rights are akin to “intellectual property” 
rights, a person’s image is not a “product of the human intellect.”  Black’s 
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  “[T]he right of publicity flows from the right 
to privacy,” Alvarez Guedes v. Marcano Martinez, 131 F. Supp. 2d 272, 278 
(D.P.R. 2001) (citing numerous cases), which is an intangible right of a 
different nature.  Despite the Doe plaintiffs’ attorney’s contention at oral 
argument that a photograph may be copyrightable, it does not follow that the 
underlying image is ipso facto protectable under intellectual property law.  
See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264 
(10th Cir. 2008) (“Recognizing that Oscar Wilde’s inimitable visage does not 
belong, or ‘owe its origins’ to any photographer, the Supreme Court noted 
that photographs may well sometimes lack originality and are thus not per 
se copyrightable. . . . [P]hotographs are copyrightable, if only to the extent of 
their original depiction of the subject.  Wilde’s image is not copyrightable; 
but to the extent a photograph reflects the photographer’s decisions 
regarding pose, positioning, background, lighting, shading, and the like, 
those elements can be said to ‘owe their origins’ to the photographer, making 
the photograph copyrightable, at least to that extent.”), citing Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).  Courts also disagree as 
to whether state law intellectual property claims are exempted under section 
230.  Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1119 (9th Cir. 
2007) (“In the absence of a definition from Congress, we construe the term 
“intellectual property” to mean ‘federal intellectual property.’”) with Doe v. 
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008) 
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plausible claims for unauthorized use of their images.  Plaintiffs do not allege 
that defendants used their images to extract any direct benefit (such as 
featuring plaintiffs on advertisements for Backpage).  Rather, the allegation 
is that defendants benefitted incidentally from the fee charged for posting 
advertisements with the Doe plaintiffs’ pictures in the escorts section of the 
website.  The argument, however, has been explicitly rejected by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.14 
[T]the crucial distinction under G.L. c. 214, s 3A, must be 
between situations in which the defendant makes an incidental 
use of the plaintiff’s name, portrait or picture and those in which 
the defendant uses the plaintiff’s name, portrait or picture 
deliberately to exploit its value for advertising or trade purposes. 
 
Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 749 (1980).  “‘The fact that the 
defendant is engaged in the business of publication, for example of a 
newspaper, out of which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to 
make the incidental publication a commercial use of the name or likeness.’”  
                                            
(“[Section] 230(e)(2) applies simply to ‘any law pertaining to intellectual 
property,’ not just federal law.”). 
 
 14 “[A]s a federal court considering state law claims, we must apply the 
state’s law on substantive issues and ‘we are bound by the teachings of the 
state’s highest court.’”  Phoung Luc v. Wyndham Mgmt. Corp., 496 F.3d 85, 
88 (1st Cir. 2007), citing N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lapalme, 258 F.3d 35, 
37-38 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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Id., quoting Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Me. 1977) (in turn 
quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, cmt. d (1977)); see also 
Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254 Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 62 F. Supp. 
2d 483, 506 (D.R.I. 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 
remanded sub nom. Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254, Serv. Employees Int’l 
Union AFL-CIO, 241 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The Rhode Island legislature 
borrowed the Privacy Act’s scheme of four privacy torts, including the tort of 
false light, from the doctrine of privacy torts promulgated by the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  See Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 479 
(D.R.I. 1999); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B-E (establishing the 
four privacy torts).  Accordingly, Rhode Island courts have often turned to 
the Restatement as an authority on the matter of privacy torts.”). 
 Copyright Infringement  
 Jane Doe No. 3 obtained a registration for her photograph on 
December 18, 2014, after this lawsuit was filed.  Although registration is not 
a jurisdictional prerequisite of bringing a suit for copyright infringement, 
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166 (2010), it is a “condition 
precedent for obtaining certain remedies, such as statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees.”  Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2005); see also 
17 U.S.C § 412 (“[N]o award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees . . . 
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shall be made for – (1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work 
commenced before the effective date of its registration.”). 
   The only recovery remaining open to Jane Doe No. 3 is compensatory 
damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504.  Section 504 permits recovery of “the actual 
damages suffered by [] her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of 
the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into 
account in computing the actual damages.”  With respect to the latter, Jane 
Doe No. 3 alleges that “[t]he Backpage Defendants derive a financial benefit 
directly attributable to the public display of such photographs by virtue of 
the payment of fees by the pimps and traffickers to Backpage.com.”  SAC ¶ 
139.  However, she may only recover profits from defendants that are 
causally linked to specific acts of infringement.  See On Davis v. The Gap, 
Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159-161 (2d Cir. 2001).  Here no plausible link exists 
between defendants’ generalized profits and any common-law copyright 
vesting in Jane Doe No. 3’s photo for the simple reason that the fee for 
posting an ad is the same whether or not it includes a photograph.  Jane Doe 
No. 3 does not allege that she suffered any loss of revenues or licensing fees 
for her photo as a result of the infringement (nor does she allege that the 
protectable elements of the photo, see n.12 supra, have any market value).  
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Because she does not plead any redressable damages, Jane Doe No. 3’s 
copyright infringement claim must also be dismissed. 
*** 
 To avoid any misunderstanding, let me make it clear that the court is 
not unsympathetic to the tragic plight described by Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe 
No. 2, and Jane Doe No. 3.  Nor does it regard the sexual trafficking of 
children as anything other than an abhorrent evil.  Finally, the court is not 
naïve – I am fully aware that sex traffickers and other purveyors of illegal 
wares ranging from drugs to pornography exploit the vulnerabilities of the 
Internet as a marketing tool.  Whether one agrees with its stated policy or 
not (a policy driven not simply by economic concerns, but also by 
technological and constitutional considerations), Congress has made the 
determination that the balance between suppression of trafficking and 
freedom of expression should be struck in favor of the latter in so far as the 
Internet is concerned.  Putting aside the moral judgment that one might pass 
on Backpage’s business practices, this court has no choice but to adhere to 
the law that Congress has seen fit to enact.   
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ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint is ALLOWED.  The Clerk is directed to enter judgment 
accordingly and close this case. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
   /s/ Richard G. Stearns 
   __________________________ 
      UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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